Primary Frequency Response Reserve Products for Inverter-Based Resources by Garcia, Manuel et al.












Primary frequency control in power systems is
being challenged by the large-scale integration of
inverter-based resources (IBRs) because they do not
typically respond to frequency fluctuations. This paper
suggests introducing new reserve products into the
electricity market that provide incentive for IBRs to
contribute to primary frequency control in ways that
take advantage of their fast-acting capabilities. In
addition to a Primary Frequency Response (PFR)
reserve product, which accommodates standard droop
control, we suggest introducing a Fast Frequency
Response (FFR) reserve product, a reserve product
for Virtual Inertia (VI), which is also known as
synthetic inertia, and an inertia product. We
adopt a reserve requirement that guarantees sufficient
primary frequency response reserve to adequately arrest
frequency decline in response to a large generator
outage within a certain margin. We place this
reserve requirement into a real-time co-optimization
problem, derive prices for each product and analyze the
incentives provided to IBRs.
1. Introduction
The penetration of inverter-based resources (IBRs)
has been increasing rapidly in modern power systems.
These resources do not inherently provide inertial
response and traditionally do not respond to frequency
variations and thus they have placed a burden on primary
frequency control. To provide incentive for IBRs to
provide primary frequency control, this paper suggests
introducing new reserve products into the electricity
market. Reserve requirements are formulated and prices
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are derived for these products. We then analyze the
pricing incentives to determine which product an IBR
may prefer to provide.
Various types of fast-acting primary frequency
control have been proposed in the literature that are
intended to be provided by IBRs [1]. This paper
will focus on three such responses. Droop control
responds proportionally to frequency deviations and is
consistent with traditional primary frequency control
used in power systems today. Traditional droop
control is provided by synchronous generators and
operates within a reserve type that we will refer to
as Primary Frequency Response (PFR) reserve. Fast
Frequency Response (FFR) exhibits a step response
to the frequency deviation, fully activating when the
frequency falls below a specified trigger point. Virtual
Inertia (VI) is sometimes referred to as synthetic inertia
and represents derivative control on the frequency,
which is a response that is very similar to inertia
provided by synchronous generators. In this paper a
reserve product is defined for each of these types of
primary frequency control in addition to a product for
synchronous inertia. Each of these products are then
coupled through an extended version of the reserve
requirement from [2]. This reserve requirement is
placed into a real-time co-optimization problem from
which prices are derived for each product.
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT)
is the first Independent System Operator (ISO) in
North America to introduce an ancillary service product
specifically intended to provide primary frequency
control [3, 4]. For this reason, we focus our analysis
on ERCOT; however, the models used in this paper are
general and are applicable outside of Texas. Indeed,
other regions have identified the need to address
declining performance of primary frequency control,
e.g. [5]. That being said, ERCOT’s ancillary services
market is currently being reformed and ERCOT has
recently introduced Fast Frequency Response (FFR)
reserve [3, 6]. Two approaches have been taken to derive
reserve requirements using ERCOT’s definition of FFR
reserve. The first was [7], which utilized empirically





determined equivalency ratios. The second was [2, 8],
which derived PFR reserve limits from first principles
that place ramping rate limits on PFR reserve assigned
to each generator based on total FFR reserve. Consistent
with ISO protocols throughout the United States, these
primary frequency response reserve requirements ensure
frequency decline will be arrested before reaching some
minimum frequency threshold in response to a large
generator outage.
Electricity markets in the United States today have
not yet introduced inertia or VI reserve as a product.
In fact, reference [9] points out that there is no clear
market structure that includes inertia and that this topic
is an open research area. Very few works have proposed
market structures that include inertia. The following
references provide market mechanisms general enough
to accommodate virtual inertia. Reference [10] provides
a market mechanism based on auction theory that
compensates inertia based on a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
payment rule. Reference [11] places a requirement into
a dispatch problem and prices this requirement using
marginal prices based on the Lagrange multipliers.
The requirement priced in [11] ensures the
maximum Rate-of-Change-of-Frequency (ROCOF)
limit is satisfied in response to a large generator outage.
In contrast, the constraint priced in this paper, adopted
from [2], ensures the frequency is arrested before the
frequency reaches some critical frequency threshold.
Although inertia and VI themselves are not capable of
arresting frequency decline, the reserve requirement
from [2] illustrates that inertia is capable of reducing the
average ROCOF before the frequency nadir is reached,
allowing other resources more time to react before the
critical frequency threshold is met. We suggest that
this is a more appropriate application for VI because
IBRs are capable of reliably imitating inertia on the
time scales associated with arresting frequency decline
but may not be capable of reacting on faster time-scales
required to reduce the maximum ROCOF.
Various works derive frequency response reserve
requirements that ensure frequency is adequately
arrested in response to a large generator outage;
however, these works do not consider VI reserve,
most do not consider FFR reserve as defined by
ERCOT, and many do not derive prices for these
reserve types in a market setting. References [12, 13,
14] derive such reserve requirements using a model
of frequency response reserve that is most consistent
with our model of PFR reserve. Reference [15] uses
a general model of a generator that is capable of
accommodating FFR reserve and VI reserve; however,
they utilize a pre-determined frequency trajectory
that does not vary with the system operating point.
References [16, 17] claim to be easily generalized to
accommodate multiple different models of frequency
response reserve; however, they have only been studied
with respect to a model that is most consistent with
our model of PFR reserve, which experiences a time
delay followed by a constant ramp rate. Reference [18]
expands upon [16, 17] by deriving reserve prices for
resources with different ramp rates and time delays. In
contrast, our work models frequency response reserve
types intended for IBRs as responding to the frequency
during the post-outage dynamics rather than being a
fixed function of time.
This paper differs from previous work by
representing VI reserve in a reserve requirement
that ensures frequency is adequately arrested in
response to a large generator outage. Furthermore, this
paper is the first to derive prices for primary frequency
response reserve products having significantly different
requirements for energy reserve procurement. Indeed,
ERCOT currently requires FFR reserve to be sustained
for 15 minutes after being deployed, which requires
significant energy reserve [3] and may be burdensome
for some IBRs such as storage devices. In contrast, the
derivative response associated with VI reserve requires
very little energy reserve because this response is only
temporary. This allows us to study the incentives
of IBRs with different power and energy reserve
capabilities regarding which products they would
provide most profitably. In this context we find that
many IBRs will have incentive to provide both VI
reserve and FFR reserve simultaneously. Furthermore,
energy-constrained IBRs have incentive to provide more
VI reserve than FFR reserve and power-constrained
IBRs have incentive to provide more FFR reserve than
VI reserve. Although IBRs generally could also provide
PFR reserve, we show that they do not have incentive
to do so because the PFR reserve price is always lower
than the FFR reserve price.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the proposed frequency response
products. Section 3 provides models for both profit
maximizing market participants considered in our work,
namely, IBRs and synchronous generators. Section 4
introduces VI reserve into the reserve requirement
originally derived in [2, 8], places this requirement into
a real-time co-optimization problem, derives the product
prices, and proves that each IBR has incentive to follow
its dispatched instructions. Section 5 provides numerical
results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Frequency Response Products
This section provides physical models of inertia,
VI reserve, PFR reserve, and FFR reserve and
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also discusses the energy and power qualification
requirements for an IBR to provide VI reserve, PFR
reserve, and FFR reserve as a product in the electricity
market. The general qualification requirement states that
an IBR must have sufficient energy and power reserve
to provide the reserve product of interest in response
to a generator outage of size L. In fact, the reserve
requirements in Section 4.1 ensure that the frequency
remains above some critical frequency threshold ω in
response to a generator outage of size L, where ω
corresponds in practice to the threshold for involuntary
under-frequency load shedding.
Throughout this paper we use subscripts to refer to
elements of vectors and matrices. For example, ri is the
ith element of vector r and Hij is the element in the ith
row and jth column of matrix H . The vector of ones is
denoted 1 and the transpose operator is denoted †.
2.1. Swing Equation and Inertia
Synchronous inertia, provided by synchronous
generators, affects the frequency trajectory of the
system. This trajectory is determined by the system
dynamics and will be represented in this work by a
simplified version of the swing equation. For simplicity,
we will often refer to synchronous inertia as inertia
and refer to synchronous generators as generators. The
post-outage inertia provided by generator i is fixed and
will be denoted Mi (in units of Watt-seconds or Ws).
The voltage frequency at time t is modeled as
being the same at each generator in the system and is
denoted ω(t). The total post-outage inertia provided
by synchronous generators is 1†M and represents the
sum of inertia values for all synchronous generators
in service after the outage. The system dynamics






(1†m(t) +1†p(t) +1†d(t)−e(t)), (1)
where m(t) ∈ Rn represents the vector of mechanical
power output from the turbine governor of each
generator in the system and e(t) ∈ R represents the total
net electrical demand in the system. The net demand
e(t) will also include the nominal power trajectory of all
IBRs. Deviation from the nominal trajectory provided
by each IBR through VI and FFR are respectively
denoted p(t) ∈ Rβ and d(t) ∈ Rβ . The total number
of generators and IBRs are respectively denoted n and
β. This model makes the simplifying assumption that
there is no system damping. The nominal frequency is
denoted ω0 and is assumed to be the frequency prior to
the generator outage, which occurs at time t = 0.
2.2. Virtual Inertia Reserve
The VI provided by inverter-based resource (IBR)
j intends to mimic inertia provided by synchronous
generators and will be denoted M̂j . In order to provide
VI, IBR j must provide a required amount of VI reserve,
which is denoted νj and represents a power quantity.
We define the VI response to be active only if
the frequency is below its nominal value. This
definition only requires energy reserve procurement in
one direction consistent with current practices of most
ISOs, which only define contingency related reserves to
accommodate generator outages, not load outages.
A resource providing VI in the amount M̂j will






dt ω(t) ≤ ω0
0 ω(t) > ω0
(2)
This response is equivalent to derivative control on
the frequency with a proportionality constant −2M̂jω0 .
Indeed, responding in this way requires a measurement
of the derivative of the frequency dω(t)dt . Since this value
must be measured, VI does not respond instantaneously
in the same way as inertia provided by synchronous
generators. As a result, VI experiences a time
delay as compared to inertia provided by synchronous
generators meaning that (2) is only satisfied after a
delay; however, this delay is very small and can be
considered negligible for most applications except for
mitigating the maximum ROCOF after a contingency.
In response to a large generator outage, the ROCOF
will be largest the instant after the outage occurs and
before any reserve types are capable of reacting, where
the ROCOF is denoted |dω(t)dt | and |·| represents the
absolute value. We assume that a ROCOF limit is
enforced denoted ω′, and effectively places a lower
limit on the total post-outage synchronous inertia. A
maximum available power requirement can then be
determined from the VI response (2). Specifically, a
unit providing VI must be able to provide the following





To follow the VI response in (2) an IBR must be capable
of attaining a negative power response, e.g. pj(t) < 0.
This negative power response will occur during small
natural fluctuations in the frequency trajectory and when
the frequency is being restored to its nominal value after
an event. In this paper we assume that the negative
power reserve procurement is negligibly small because
the derivative of the frequency is typically small in
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magnitude during the recovery process after a frequency
event. Future work may investigate an alternative power
requirement for VI reserve in this direction.
A resource providing VI must have the ability to
sustain its inertial response for a frequency deviation of






Importantly, a storage device providing VI reserve
should be capable of reacting to multiple successive
frequency events under the assumption that the
frequency fully recovers to its nominal value between
events. Specifically, the virtual inertia response (2)
requires the energy reserve to be replenished between
events when the frequency is restored to its nominal
value so that sufficient energy would then be available
to respond to a subsequent outage.
2.3. Primary Frequency Response Reserve
PFR reserve is compatible with conventional
generator droop control provided by synchronous
generators. Generator i provides an amount of
PFR reserve denoted ri. We adopt the approximate
piece-wise linear model of PFR reserve initially
presented in [12] and explained in detail in [8]. This
model of PFR reserve is similar to the constant ramp rate
models in [12, 13, 14, 16, 17]. More specifically, after
the frequency reaches the lower end of the frequency
dead-band ω1 the turbine governor is modeled as
experiencing a small time delay ε. After this time delay,
the mechanical power outputmi(t) is modeled as having
a constant governor ramp rate κi that continues for a
time of riκi , allowing all PFR reserve to be deployed.
As we will see in Section 4.2, the price for FFR
reserve is larger than the price for PFR reserve and
thus IBRs do not have incentive to provide PFR reserve.
Nevertheless, market rules do not prohibit IBRs from
providing PFR reserve. If an IBR were to provide PFR
reserve, then its energy requirement should be similar to
the energy requirement for FFR reserve; however, this
energy requirement is not specified in current protocols.
2.4. Fast Frequency Response Reserve
FFR reserve is defined consistently with ERCOT’s
definition [20, 21]. The amount of FFR reserve provided
by IBR j is denoted bj . We assume that FFR reserve can
be fully deployed instantaneously. The FFR reserve is
deployed when the frequency drops below a frequency
of ω2 < ω1. That is, by design FFR deploys in ERCOT
after the onset of PFR, assuming that the delay ε in
activation of PFR is negligible. When deployed, FFR
reserve instantaneously increases the quantity dj(t) by
an amount bj for IBR j.
To provide FFR reserve, an IBR must meet a
qualification requirement for power and for energy.
First, the resource must be capable of deploying bj units
of power and thus the power reserve requirement for
FFR reserve is straight forward. Second, the resource
must be capable of sustaining full deployment of bj for a
specified amount of time ∆t, which is set to 15 minutes,
or ∆t = 900 seconds, in ERCOT [20].
FFREnergyReservej = bj∆t (5)
This requirement ensures that FFR reserve will last long
enough for slower acting reserve to replace it.
3. Profit Maximization
We present a simplified myopic market setting that
consists of two types of profit maximizing market
participants. The first is a synchronous generator that
provides electric generation, PFR reserve, and inertia as
products in the electricity market. The second is an IBR
that provides electric generation, FFR reserve, and VI
reserve as products in the electricity market.
3.1. Synchronous Generators
We will assume that there is one generator located
at each of the n buses in the system without loss
of generality. A synchronous generator i is paid for
producing a power quantity of Gi in accordance with
its Locational Marginal Price (LMP) πi and is paid
for providing PFR reserve ri in accordance with the
PFR reserve price χ. A synchronous generator i is
also paid for providing a fixed amount of post-outage
inertiaMi in accordance with the price for inertia Ψ, see
Remark 1. The LMP is specific to a location, or bus, in
the system. The inertia price and PFR reserve price are
common to all generators. The costs for generator i are
represented by the general convex function Ci(Gi, ri).
Although the cost is generally represented as a function
of the generation Gi and reserve ri, the cost of a
synchronous generator typically only depends directly
on the generation Gi. Under the assumption that the
price is not affected by the generation and reserve
quantities provided by a single generator, i.e. the
price-taker assumption, each generator will maximize
their profits by producing generation and reserve that
solves the following problem.
max
ri∈R+,Gi∈R+
πiGi + χri + ΨMi − Ci(Gi, ri) (6)
Gi ≤ Gi ≤ Gi − ri (6a)
ri ≤ ri (6b)
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The generation limit constraint, which includes PFR
reserve head-room, is represented in (6a). The constraint
(6b) limits each generator’s PFR reserve where the
limit ri is considered fixed from the perspective of the
generator and is chosen by the ISO. In this context the
PFR reserve limit ri represents the maximum amount
of PFR reserve a generator can provide before the
frequency reaches the critical frequency threshold in
response to a specified generator outage of size L, see
Section 4.1. Any PFR reserve provided by generator
i that exceeds this value would be unavailable to
arrest frequency decline due to ramping limitations.
Intuitively, the ISO is only willing to pay for at most ri
units of PFR reserve from generator i because ramping
limitations physically limit the generator from providing
more PFR reserve.
The PFR reserve limit ri is an artifact of the
reserve requirements proposed in Section 4.1, will be
optimized as a variable in the real-time co-optimization
problem (10), and is upper bounded by the offered
PFR reserve capacity Ri by the constraint (10f). The
offered PFR reserve capacity Ri is a quantity offered by
each generator in a market setting and limits the PFR
reserve a generator is willing to provide. ISO’s typically
place a hard limit on the offered PFR reserve capacity
Ri. In ERCOT the offered PFR reserve capacity Ri is
typically limited by 0.2Gi; however, this offered PFR
reserve capacity limit depends on the generator’s droop
percentage, see [8].
Remark 1. The inertia for each generator is fixed
and is therefore not represented as a variable in the
profit maximization problem (6); however, the fixed
inertia payment ΨMi is included in the objective
for completeness. Furthermore, the proposed reserve
requirements aim to accommodate the simultaneous
outage of the two generators with the largest capacity. In
this context the two generators with the largest capacity
have post-outage inertia levels of zero, e.g. Mi = 0, and
should not receive payment for providing inertia.
3.2. Inverter-based Resources
We assume there are β IBRs in total located at
various buses in the system. The sparse matrix
H ∈ Rn×β maps each IBR to its corresponding bus
where IBR j is located at bus i if Hij = 1. IBR j
is paid for producing electric power fj , which may be
negative, based on the price π†Hj where Hj is the
jth column of H . The corresponding electric energy
generation required from IBR j is expressed as τfj ,
where τ represents the market clearing interval length
and is set to 5 minutes, or τ = 300 seconds, to
match ERCOT’s real-time market. IBR j is paid for
producing FFR reserve bj based on the price φ and
paid for producing VI reserve νj based on the price ψ.
These prices are modeled as being common to all IBRs.
The costs for IBR j are represented by the general
convex function Pj(fj , bj , νj). Under the price-taker
assumption, each resource will maximize its profits





π†Hjfj + φbj + ψνj − Pj(fj , bj , νj) (7)
bj ≤ fj ≤ bj − bj − νj (7a)
Bj ≤ τfj ≤ Bj −∆tbj −
(ω0−ω)
ω′ νj (7b)
Constraint (7a) ensures that the electric power
generation fj falls within the upper and lower power
output limits, denoted bj and bj , while also accounting
for reserve head-room. Constraint (7b) ensures that the
electric energy generation τfj falls within the upper
and lower energy output limits, denoted Bj and Bj ,
while also accounting for energy reserve. The energy
reserve quantities for FFR reserve and virtual inertia are
represented as linear expressions of the power quantities
bj and νj . The expression for FFR energy reserve ∆tbj
follows directly from equation (5). The expression for
virtual inertia energy reserve (ω0−ω)ω′ νj is obtained from
equations (3) and (4). Specifically, the expression for
virtual inertia M̂j =
νjω0
2ω′ is obtained from (3) and
substituted into (4). See Remark 2 for an example of
an IBR that fits into this model.
Remark 2. The main body of this paper will leave
the IBR profit maximization problem (7) general to
accommodate many different types of IBRs and bidding
strategies. However, the numerical results section,
Section 5, will analyze an IBR that represents a storage
device only participating in revenue streams associated
with FFR reserve and VI reserve. This model will
represent a storage device that does not participate in
temporal energy arbitrage on the LMP and thus its power
output will be fixed to fj = 0. In Section 5, we
also assume that the storage devices are fully charged,
resulting in bj = Bj = 0. Furthermore, costs associated
with FFR reserve and VI reserve will be approximated
as being zero. Indeed, these costs should be low because
the cost of charging the storage device to provide reserve
can be amortized over many market intervals assuming
that frequency events are rare.
4. Product Pricing and Incentives
This section proposes a reserve requirement that
expands upon [2] and then places this reserve
requirement into a real-time co-optimization problem.
Prices are then defined for PFR reserve, FFR reserve,
VI reserve and inertia products. We then provide a
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result stating that all market participants have incentive
to follow their dispatched instructions from the ISO.
4.1. Requirement to Arrest Frequency Decline
Reference [2] derives reserve requirements that
ensure sufficient frequency response to arrest the
frequency decline before it reaches the critical frequency
threshold of ω in response to a generator outage of
specified size L. To accommodate the simultaneous
outage of the two largest generators in the system,
L would be chosen to be the sum of their capacities
Gi. This reserve requirement places a lower limit on
the sum of all FFR reserve and PFR reserve and also
places an upper limit on the amount of PFR reserve a
single generator can provide. This PFR reserve limit
is represented as a nonlinear function of the total FFR
reserve 1†b and inertia including VI 1†M+1†M̂ . The
requirement is generally expressed as follows:
1†r + 1†b ≥ L (8)
r ≤ κh(1†M + ω02ω′1
†ν,1†b) + δ (9)
The general requirement (8) ensures sufficient PFR
reserve and FFR reserve to cover the loss of generation
L. The rate-based PFR reserve limit (9) ensures that
each generator has the ramping ability to provide all of
its PFR reserve before the critical frequency threshold is
reached in response to an outage of size L.
The rate-based PFR reserve limit (9) includes an
offset constant δ ∈ Rn that allows our main theoretical
result to be more general. In the context of the
reserve requirement from [2, 8], this offset constant
can be assumed to be δ = 0. The function h(·, ·) is
derived in [2, 8], is continuously differentiable, strictly
convex and increasing in both arguments. Intuitively
this function represents the time taken to reach the
frequency nadir after the generator outage occurs minus
the PFR time delay so that multiplying h(·, ·) by the
ramp rate κi results in the maximum reserve generator i
can deploy by the time of the nadir. Notice that inertia
provided by synchronous generators and VI reserve are
both included in this requirement. In fact, we suggest
that virtual inertia is capable of contributing to this
requirement because it is capable of responding on time
scales relevant to arresting frequency decline.
4.2. Real-Time Co-Optimization
We now extend the real-time co-optimization
problems from [2, 8] by introducing VI reserve from
Section 2.2, the IBR model from Section 3.2, and the
reserve requirements from Section 4.1. The demand at













Pj(fj , bj , νj)(10)
[λ] 1†(f +G−D) = 0 (10a)
[ζ] S(Hf +G−D) ≤ F (10b)
[µ] L ≤ 1†r + 1†b (10c)
[γ] r ≤ κh(1†M + ω02ω′1
†ν,1†b) + δ (10d)
[ρ, ρ] G ≤ G ≤ G− r (10e)
[σ, σ] r ≤ r ≤ R (10f)
[%, %] b ≤ f ≤ b− b− ν (10g)
[ς, ς] B ≤ τf ≤ B −∆tb− (ω0−ω)ω′ ν (10h)
Constraint (10a) enforces the overall system power
balance. Constraint (10b) enforces ` transmission line
limits, where S ∈ R`×n is a matrix of shift factors and
F ∈ R` represents the maximum power flow on each
transmission line. Constraint (10c) enforces the general
reserve requirement from (8) and (10d) enforces the
rate-based PFR reserve limit constraint from (9). Notice
that the PFR reserve limit ri is represented as a variable
and is limited by the rate-based PFR reserve limit (10d),
effectively limiting the PFR reserve ri indirectly. The
constraints for each individual generator are represented
by (10e) and (10f) and are identical to constraints (6a)
and (6b) but also enforce the offered PFR capacity
constraint r̄ ≤ R̄ as explained in Section 3.1. The
constraints for each individual IBR are represented by
(10g) and (10h) and are identical to constraints (7a) and
(7b). The Lagrange multipliers for each constraint are
indicated on the left side in square brackets.
Remark 3. The real-time co-optimization problem
(10) optimizes over the PFR reserve limit ri for each
generator i. Recall from Section 3.1 that the PFR reserve
limit ri is considered constant from the perspective of
the generator. This is because the PFR reserve limit
ri only appears in the PFR reserve limit constraint
(10d), and the right-hand-side of this constraint involves
variables that are not controlled by the generator in a
myopic real-time market context, namely, VI reserve ν,
FFR reserve b, and inertiaM , which is assumed constant
in the real-time market. Intuitively, generator i exhibits
ramping limitations preventing it from providing PFR
reserve in excess of ri in response to a generator outage
of size L. Furthermore, the ISO is not willing to pay
generator i for providing excess PFR reserve that it is
incapable of utilizing.
The proposed real-time co-optimization problem
(10) is non-convex due to the non-linear constraints
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(10d). However, since the constraints are continuous,
many iterative algorithms exist that typically converge
to a point that solves the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions along with some Lagrange multipliers. In
this paper we will assume that such a point exists for
the real-time co-optimization problem (10) and can be
obtained algorithmically using some iterative algorithm.
This identified KKT point will represent the dispatched
generation values, the dispatched reserve values, and the
PFR reserve limit that is chosen by the ISO. The KKT
point is defined as follows. We emphasize that we do
not assume this KKT point is globally or even locally
optimal for (10); however, practical iterative algorithms
will typically converge to a KKT point that is at least
locally optimal, see Remark 4.
Definition 1. The KKT conditions of the real-time
co-optimization problem are solved by the point
(G?, r?, r?, f?, b?, ν?) along with the Lagrange
multipliers (λ?, ζ?, µ?, γ?), which are used in the
proposed pricing structure, and the Lagrange multipliers
(ρ?, ρ?, σ?, σ?, %?, %?, ς?, ς?), which correspond to
private constraints of the market participants.
Remark 4. The real-time co-optimization problems
in [2, 8] do not consider VI reserve and are
still non-convex due to the rate-based PFR reserve
limit. These problems are also solved using iterative
algorithms not guaranteed to converge to global optima.
4.3. Product Prices
Prices are defined by Lagrange multipliers of the
constraints in the co-optimization problem as specified
in Definition 1. The LMPs and the prices for the
PFR reserve, FFR reserve, and VI reserve products are
respectively as follows:
πi = −λ? − S†i ζ
? ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , n] (11)
χ = µ? (12)
φ = µ? + γ?†κ∇2h (13)
ψ = γ?†κ∇1h ω02ω′ (14)
where ∇1h and ∇2h represent the partial derivatives
of h(·, ·) with respect to its first and second arguments
evaluated at the point (1†M + ω02ω′1
†ν?,1†b?) and the
ith column of S is denoted Si ∈ R`. Furthermore,
since inertia and VI reserve have the same contribution
to arresting frequency decline, their prices should agree
in a way that is consistent with their relationship in (3).




The FFR price upper bounds the PFR price because
the second term on the RHS of equation (13) is
non-negative. This pricing structure effectively places
more value in FFR reserve due to its fast ramping
capabilities. Furthermore, the energy requirement is
similar for PFR reserve and FFR reserve. As a result,
an IBR will always prefer to provide FFR reserve over
PFR reserve.
4.4. Incentive Alignment
With the prices set as in (11)-(14), the generation and
reserve quantities from Definition 1 solve the individual
profit maximization problems for generators and IBRs,
as defined in Section 3. Intuitively, this is because all
non-linear constraints in the real-time co-optimization
problem are being priced and because the individual
profit maximization problems are convex. This is stated
formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider a KKT point as in Definition 1
and assume the prices are set as in (11)-(14).
(a) The generation dispatch and reserve quantities
(G?i , r
?
i ) solve the generator profit maximization
problems (6) for each generator i.





j ) solve the IBR profit maximization
problems (7) for each IBR j.
Proof: If the the KKT point from Definition 1 solves
the KKT conditions for the problems (6) and (7), then
this point must also be globally optimal for the problems
(6) and (7) because they are both convex and thus the
KKT conditions imply global optimality. To complete
the proof, we prove that the KKT point from Definition1
satisfies the KKT conditions for problems (6) and (7).
Note that there are three parts to the KKT conditions:
the stationarity condition, the dual feasibility condition,
and the primal feasibility condition.
(a) The KKT point from Definition 1 must satisfy the
following stationarity condition for problem (10) with
respect to Gi and ri respectively:
∇1Ci + λ? + S†i ζ
? − ρ?
i
+ ρ?i = 0 (15)
∇2Ci − µ? + ρ?i + σ?i = 0 (16)
where ∇1Ci and ∇2Ci represent partial derivatives of
Ci(·, ·) with respect to its first and second arguments
evaluated at (G?i , r
?
i ) and are assumed to be continuous.
If the prices are chosen as in (11) and (12), then these
conditions are identical to the stationarity conditions
of (6) with respect to Gi and ri respectively where
[ρ?
i
, ρ?i ] represent the Lagrange multipliers of constraints
(6a) and σ?i represents the Lagrange multiplier of
the constraint (6b). Furthermore, these Lagrange
multipliers must be non-negative in order to satisfy
the dual feasibility condition for the co-optimization
problem (10) and thus they must also satisfy the dual
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feasibility condition for (6). Finally, since primal
feasibility is satisfied for problem (10) the values
(G?i , r
?
i ) must satisfy constraints (10e) and (10f) and
as a result must also satisfy constraints (6a) and (6b),
proving primal feasibility for (6). As a result, the KKT
conditions hold for (6), proving part (a).
(b) The KKT point from Definition 1 must satisfy the
following stationarity condition for problem (10) with




+ %?j − τς?j + τς
?
j =0 (17)
∇2Pj − µ? − γ?†κ∇2h+ %?j + ς?j∆t=0 (18)







where ∇1Pj , ∇2Pj , and ∇3Pj represent partial
derivatives of Pj(·, ·, ·) with respect to its first, second,




j ) and are
assumed to be continuous.
If the prices are chosen as in (11), (13), and (14),
then these conditions are identical to the stationarity
conditions of (7) with respect to fj , bj , and νj
respectively where [%?
j
, %?j ] represent the Lagrange
multipliers of constraints (7a) and [ς?j , ς
?
j ] represent the
Lagrange multipliers of constraints (7b). Furthermore,
these Lagrange multipliers must be non-negative in
order to satisfy the dual feasibility condition for the
co-optimization problem (10) and thus they must also
satisfy the dual feasibility condition for (7). Finally,
since primal feasibility is satisfied for problem (10) the




j ) must satisfy constraints (10g) and
(10h) and as a result must also satisfy constraints (7a)
and (7b), proving primal feasibility for (7). As a result,
the KKT conditions hold for (7), proving part (b).
5. Numerical Results
This section studies the coupling between PFR
reserve, FFR reserve, VI reserve and inertia in a
market setting using a 2000 bus test case that is
intended to have characteristics similar to the ERCOT
system [22]. The PFR reserve costs of a synchronous
generator are assumed to be zero, consistent with
Section 3.1, resulting in cost functions that are only
a function of generation and represent the hourly cost
of generating Gi MW of power. The 75 natural gas
generators with the largest capacity are selected to
provide PFR reserve and their offered PFR capacity
is Ri = 0.2Gi. We consider a loss of generation
of L = 2750MW and an FFR duration requirement
of ∆t = 900 seconds unless stated otherwise. The
function h(·, ·) is defined using parameters from [2].
Although ERCOT does not currently enforce a ROCOF
limit, we assume it is ω̄′=0.5Hz/s and assume the
post-outage inertia is 163GWs. We use Matlab and
Knitro’s interior-point solver [23].
We assume each IBR j represents a fully charged
storage device as described in Remark 2 and has power
capacity bj = 1MW. Consistent with Remark 2 this
storage device does not participate in temporal energy
arbitrage and thus fj is set to zero. As a result,
these storage devices do not appear in the transmission
constraints in the co-optimization problem (10) and
their physical location in the system is not modeled.
For this reason we do not specify the location of the
IBRs. To emulate the diversity of typical market
participants, the energy capacity is chosen randomly
for each IBR. Specifically, the ratio of energy to power
capacityBj/bj is uniformly randomly sampled between
the values of 100 and 1000 seconds, which represents
approximate power to energy capacity ratios for lithium
ion batteries [24]. In other words, the MWs energy
capacity is modeled as Bj∼U [100, 1000].
Figure 1 illustrates the reserve procurement, the
prices, and the payments as the number of IBRs increase
from 0 to 1000, which increases the total MW capacity
of IBRs 1†b from 0 to 1000 MW. Figure 1a provides
the total PFR reserve, FFR reserve, and VI reserve as
the total power capacity 1†b increases. FFR reserve
and VI reserve increase linearly with the total power
capacity with less total reserve being designated for VI
reserve. As FFR reserve increases it directly replaces
PFR reserve in order to strictly satisfy the general
requirement (10c).
Figure 1b provides the prices for PFR reserve, FFR
reserve, VI reserve, and the LMP, where the LMP
πi is the same at each bus i in the system because
there is no transmission congestion. Consistent with
current practice, these prices are specified in units of
$/MWh, which represents the price of providing a MW
quantity of generation or reserve for an entire hour.
The price for inertia Ψ is not provided in this plot;




≈ 0.0167s−1, as explained
in Section 4.3. All prices steadily decline as more IBRs
are introduced. As expected from Section 4.3, the FFR
reserve price φ is always higher than the PFR reserve
price χ. As explained in Section 2.3, PFR reserve and
FFR reserve have a similar energy reserve requirements
and thus IBRs do not have incentive to provide PFR
reserve. Similarly, the VI reserve price is always lower
than the FFR reserve price. However, IBRs may have
incentive to provide VI reserve as opposed to FFR
reserve because VI reserve has a much lower energy
reserve requirement as enforced in (7b). Specifically,
the FFR energy reserve required to provide a single unit
of FFR power reserve is ∆tω
′
(ω0−ω) = 750 times larger than
Page 3556

























(a) Total Reserve Procurement





























(c) Payments and Cost Savings
Figure 1: Three plots illustrate the effect of increasing the total number of IBRs. (a) Total power reserve provided for
VI reserve, FFR reserve, and PFR reserve. (b) Reserve prices and the LMP, where the LMP is the same at each bus.
(c) Total payments for each primary frequency response market product as well as the total generation cost savings.
the VI energy reserve required to provide a single unit
of VI power reserve.
Figure 1c provides the payments for all primary
frequency response products over an hour long period.
For each total power capacity 1†b the order from highest
to lowest paid product is as follows: PFR reserve,
inertia, FFR reserve, and VI reserve. FFR reserve and
VI reserve receive zero payment when the total power
capacity is 1†b= 0 and this payment begins to increase
as their product quantities increase. However, this
trend ends when the total power capacity 1†b reaches
a quantity of approximately 700MW, at which point
the decreasing FFR reserve price and VI reserve price
cause their total payments to decrease despite their
increasing product quantity. Furthermore, PFR reserve
and synchronous inertia receive large payment when the
total power capacity 1†b is low. This is when the reserve
requirements are most constrained, prices are highest,
and little FFR reserve and VI reserve are available.
Figure 1c illustrates the benefit of introducing the
reserve types that are intended for IBRs, namely, VI
reserve and FFR reserve. Introducing these products
into the market significantly reduces total reserve
payments and total generation costs. In our example,
when total IBR power capacity is 1†b= 0MW the total
PFR reserve payments are 6414$/h and the total inertia
payments are 5915$/h. When 1†b= 1000MW the total
payments for all reserve products and inertia sum to only
2215$/h and the total generator costs reduce by 1795$/h,
as represented by the trajectory labeled cost savings.
Finally, we illustrate the incentives seen by an
IBR that experiences a trade-off between two revenue
streams associated with FFR reserve and VI reserve.
Figure 2 plots each IBR’s optimal VI reserve to FFR
reserve ratio ν?j /b
?
j versus its energy capacity to power
capacity ratio Bj/bj for different values of ∆t. For
a given ∆t, one point in this plot represents one of
the 1000 IBRs that were introduced. Throughout our
testing, we numerically observed that the VI reserve
to FFR reserve ratio ν?j /b
?
j for any given IBR j
as determined by the co-optimization problem does
not change as the total power capacity 1†b increases
between the values of 0 to 1000MW. As a result, these
curves remain the same for any total power capacity 1†b
between the values of 0 to 1000MW. Furthermore, the
value ∆t=900 seconds matches that used in Figure 1.






t = 300 sec.
t = 600 sec.
t = 900 sec.
t = 1200 sec.
t = 1500 sec.
t = 1800 sec.
Figure 2: Each IBR’s optimal VI reserve to FFR reserve
ratio ν?j /b
?
j versus its energy capacity to power capacity
ratio Bj/bj for different values of ∆t.
Figure 2 shows that the optimal VI reserve to FFR
reserve ratio ν?j /b
?
j for an IBR decreases in its energy
capacity to power capacity ratio Bj/bj . In other words,
an IBR with a small energy capacity and a large power
capacity will provide more VI reserve than FFR reserve.
Conversely, an IBR with a large energy capacity and
a small power capacity will provide more FFR reserve
than VI reserve. Furthermore, the optimal VI reserve to
FFR reserve ratio ν?j /b
?
j reaches zero at the point where
Bj/bj = ∆t. Intuitively, if an IBR had unlimited energy
capacity it would have incentive to provide FFR reserve
as opposed to VI reserve because the FFR reserve price
is higher; however, the energy capacity constraint (7b)
may prevent the IBR from allocating all of its power
capacity towards FFR reserve. If the energy capacity
to power capacity ratio exceeds Bj/bj = ∆t, then all
power capacity can be allocated towards FFR reserve
without reaching the energy capacity.
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Figure 2 also illustrates the effect of varying the
value ∆t, which represents the required amount of
time an IBR must be capable of providing a full
FFR response, see Section 2.4. In fact, an ISO can
design this parameter to adjust the incentives of an
IBR. Specifically, as ∆t increases, each IBR will have
incentive to provide less FFR reserve as compared to VI
reserve, moving the curve up and to the right. However,
this effect diminishes as ∆t increases, illustrated by each
successive curve shifting by a smaller amount.
6. Conclusions
This paper derived prices for PFR reserve, FFR
reserve, VI reserve, and inertia as products in a
real-time electricity market. The prices were derived
from Lagrange multipliers of a reserve requirement
that ensures frequency decline will be arrested before
reaching a critical frequency threshold in response to a
specified generator outage. We proved that the proposed
prices provide incentive for IBRs to follow their dispatch
instructions. We also determined that power-constrained
IBRs prefer to provide FFR reserve over VI reserve and
energy-constrained IBRs prefer to provide VI reserve
over FFR reserve. Finally, we illustrated that the
introduction of FFR reserve and VI reserve reduce total
reserve payments and total generation costs.
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M. Chazarra, and Á. Fernández-Espina, “Fast frequency
control ancillary services: An international review,”
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 120,
p. 109662, 2020.
[5] P. Mancarella et al., “Power system security assessment
of the future national electricity market,” University of
Melbourne, 2017.
[6] ERCOT, “NPRR 581: Add fast responding regulation
service as a subset of regulation service,” tech. rep.,
ERCOT, February 2014.
[7] W. Li, P. Du, and N. Lu, “Design of a new
primary frequency control market for hosting frequency
response reserve offers from both generators and loads,”
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 5,
pp. 4883–4892, 2018.
[8] M. Garcia and R. Baldick, “Requirements for
interdependent reserve types providing primary
frequency control,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, 2021.
[9] U. Tamrakar et al., “Virtual inertia: Current trends and
future directions,” Applied Sciences, vol. 7, no. 7, p. 654,
2017.
[10] B. K. Poolla, S. Bolognani, L. Na, and F. Dörfler,
“A market mechanism for virtual inertia,” IEEE
Transactions on Smart Grid, 2020.
[11] M. Paturet et al., “Economic valuation and pricing
of inertia in inverter-dominated power systems,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:2005.11029, 2020.
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